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In sentencing guilty defendants, jurors and judges weigh ‘mitigating circumstances’, which create 
sympathy for a defendant. Here we use functional magnetic resonance imaging to measure 
neural activity in ordinary citizens who are potential jurors, as they decide on mitigation of 
punishment for murder. We found that sympathy activated regions associated with mentalising 
and moral conflict (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, precuneus and temporo-parietal junction). 
sentencing also activated precuneus and anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting that mitigation 
is based on negative affective responses to murder, sympathy for mitigating circumstances and 
cognitive control to choose numerical punishments. Individual differences on the inclination to 
mitigate, the sentence reduction per unit of judged sympathy, correlated with activity in the 
right middle insula, an area known to represent interoception of visceral states. These results 
could help the legal system understand how potential jurors actually decide, and contribute to 
growing knowledge about whether emotion and cognition are integrated sensibly in difficult 
judgments. 
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Philosophers, psychologists and legal scholars have long debated whether mercy, sympathy and compassion should reduce moral culpability of legal defendants. People do have negative 
emotional responses to a wide range of situational factors that are 
not normatively justifiable because they are not considered evidence, 
or appeal to ‘prejudices and sympathy’, which jurors are typically 
instructed to ignore, for example, gruesome crime scene pictures lead 
to more mock jury convictions when they are in colour (compared 
with black and white1). Other studies show that evidence that pro-
vides negative emotions leads to more punitive judgments2. A mock 
trial study reported that jurors found a defendant less guilty when 
they heard a defense attorney urging sympathy for the defendant3.
Studies of moral cognition in hypothetical non-legal scenarios 
have revealed the increased activity in emotion-related brain regions 
(that is, insula, amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex) and decreased 
activity in cognitive processes (that is, dorsolateral prefrontal and 
parietal areas) when participants contemplated morally charged 
actions, such as a trolley dilemma involving killing lives of some 
people to save others4. Other studies indicate that people do some-
times punish norm violators in non-legal or legal situations, driven 
by moral judgments in which negative emotional reactions have a 
critical role5,6. Prosocial emotions, such as sympathy, also influence 
decision making (for example, charitable giving)3; however, there is 
currently no direct cognitive and neural evidence for how sympathy 
is translated into legal outcomes.
All these studies raise an important question of whether moral 
judgments and accompanying emotions are used reasonably (as 
legal rules require) or not. Neuroscience is now entering this debate 
about defendants, but very little is known about whether mental 
activity of juries and judges conforms to legal principles. The case 
we explore here is ‘mitigating circumstances’, a rare case where emo-
tions, such as sympathy, are allowed to influence juror judgment.
The legal domain is unusual because it may be especially 
challenging to map emotions into numerical legal outcomes. This 
difficulty is found in studies of hypothetical punitive damages in 
tort cases, which not only show that jurors typically agree on moral 
outrageousness of actions, but also show large disagreement about 
how outrage is mapped to punitive dollar awards7,8.
Weighing mitigation puts an unusual burden on people (qua 
jurors) to have appropriate emotional sympathetic reactions, then 
encode their emotions into prison years. Uncovering the cognitive 
and neural mechanisms of sympathy that motivate mitigation will 
inform the role of emotion in jurors’ decision process, and per-
haps the ultimate policy issue of what role emotional evidence can 
and should have in trials. Understanding the neuroscientific basis 
of legal mitigation adds to a basic understanding of moral neuro-
science. Neural evidence could also advance theory and practice of 
law, as so little is known about whether the mental activity of juries 
and judges conforms to normative legal principles9.
In summary, our results revealed that sympathy activated brain 
regions associated with mentalising and moral conflict, including 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), precuneus and temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ). Sentence mitigation also recruited these 
sympathy regions, uncovering neural evidence for a close relation-
ship between sympathy and mitigation. Furthermore, individual 
differences on the inclination to mitigate were reflected in differen-
tial middle insula activity. These findings do not just contribute to 
the field of neuroscience, but could help lawmakers to understand 
jurors’ decision making and their individual differences in trials.
Results
Sympathy and no-sympathy scenarios. We measured brain activity 
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while subjects 
are making hypothetical sentence reduction decisions, in dramatic 
scenarios adapted from actual murder cases. Sympathy-related brain 
activity was collected during reading circumstances pertaining to 
defendants’ crimes (Fig. 1a). Only actual Japanese murders were 
used, so the crime was serious, uniform across trials and lifelike. This 
simple design was chosen to generate engagement and limit nuisance 
brain activity due to subtle differences in crimes and plausibility of 
artificially created scenarios.
Mitigating circumstances were of two types: those that would 
induce sympathy and those that would not. The sympathy scenarios 
included desperate situations of defendants suffering from domestic 
violence, disease or poverty. Figure 1a gives one example of each 
type. The intentionality and severity of the murders were matched 
between conditions (see Supplementary Methods). After reading 
about the circumstances, subjects decided how much they would 
change the sentence given for the defendant (initially 20 years) if 
they were on a jury. After scanning, subjects were again presented 
with the same scenarios and asked to rate how much sympathy they 
felt for the defendant, using a visual analogue scale.
Sympathy and punishment ratings. The sympathy manipulation is 
internally valid because participants gave significantly higher sympathy 
ratings to those defendants with sympathy circumstances compared 
with those with no-sympathy circumstances (n = 22, paired t-test, 
t21 =  − 18.94, P < 0.001, Fig. 1b). They also reduced sentences much 
more in sympathy circumstances (n = 22, paired t-test, t21 = 11.82, 
P < 0.001, Fig. 1c). Unsurprisingly, sympathy and punishment (sen-
tence length) were highly negatively correlated (n = 32 stories, linear 
regression analysis, P < 0.001, R2 = 0.97, Fig. 1d).
fMRI results were analysed using standard generalized linear 
model regression techniques (see Methods). A short block design 
was used where regressors were included for the various events of 
the trials (Fig. 1a). Interaction terms corresponding to punishment 
and sympathy ratings interacted with trial onsets that were added 
as parametric regressors.
Brain regions associated with sympathy scenarios. We first ana-
lysed brain areas exhibiting a stronger response in sympathy scenar-
ios than no-sympathy scenarios. Precuneus, left TPJ and DMPFC 
showed larger activities for sympathy than for no-sympathy sce-
narios (n = 22, one-sample t-test, Table 1). These regions are related 
to mentalization and sympathy as discussed below in detail, which 
confirms that the experimental manipulation of sympathy produced 
results consistent with the sympathy ratings data.
Brain regions associated with punishment and sympathy. We then 
searched for brain regions that responded, during the description, to 
the subjects’ trial-by-trial ratings of sympathy and their amounts of 
punishment reduction. Activity in precuneus, DMPFC and left TPJ 
were correlated with sympathy (P < 0.05, small-volume-corrected, 
Fig. 2, Supplementary Table S1). Signal increase in precuneus and 
DMPFC were also associated with the reduction of punishment 
(P < 0.05, small-volume-corrected, Fig. 2: note that a small TPJ 
region was also activated in sentence reduction, but only with k = 6 
voxels). Thus, precuneus and DMPFC were commonly activated by 
both sympathy and reduction of punishment. Sentence reduction 
was also associated with activity in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). 
All regions showing a whole-brain correlation at P < 0.001 are listed 
in Supplementary Tables S1 and S2.
Brain regions associated with an inclination to mitigate. Next, we 
constructed an individual-specific measure of an inclination to miti-
gate, by reducing sentences, as a function of sympathy. This measure 
comes from a simple linear regression on each individual’s decisions: 
punishment = b0 + b1*sympathy + error10. A measure of an inclination 
to mitigate, the reduction in sentence per unit of sympathy, was given 
by the b1 coefficient of the regression. This number represents a com-
plex mapping from an emotional response to a number representing 
prison time for a defendant (a years-per-emotion coefficient).
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These b1 coefficients were negative for all subjects (mean = 
− 6.5 ± 0.2, linear regression analysis, all P < 0.001), indicating that 
the feeling of sympathy did correlate with reduction of punishment, 
but to different degrees across subjects. A negative linear regression 
between the individual-specific b1 coefficient and blood oxygenation 
level-dependent responses in sympathy minus no-sympathy trials 
found activity in the right middle insula (P < 0.05, small-volume-
corrected, Fig. 3). Individuals who had larger activities in the insula 
when reading circumstances showed higher tendencies to mitigate, 
reducing sentencing years more as their sympathy increased.
Discussion
Comparison of activity during judgments of sympathy, and sen-
tence reduction, suggest that activity in DMPFC (also known as 
paracingulate), precuneus (also known as posterior cingulate) and 
TPJ reflect a judgment-action circuit, which is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
Strength of sympathy judgments is associated with activity in 
DMPFC, precuneus and TPJ. DMPFC is involved in general men-
talising11 and is active when empathizing12 or sympathizing13 with 
others in pain. Precuneus has been linked to subjective perspective 
taking14–16. TPJ is also commonly identified as a part of a theory-
of-mind circuit17, including mentalising about intentions18, and was 
activated in one study on judging innocence of intentions of people 
who caused harm19. This suggests that the sympathy judgment is an 
engagement with a reasoned simulation of what the defendant was 
thinking when committing the crime or how most people would 
judge the normative basis for mitigation. Note that although pre-
cuneus and TPJ can each be activated by non-social demands as 
well (for example, attention reorienting20), they are rarely co-acti-
vated as a group unless social cognitive demands are present.
Regions activated by the punishment reduction judgment include 
a large region of precuneus and smaller regions in DMPFC and ACC. 
As noted, precuneus has been linked to simulation on the self to 
understand others, and is also active when compassionating21 and 
forgiving others22. The activation in this area is correlated with more 
iterated steps23 and higher-value24 strategic thinking in game theory 
tasks. Note that both feelings of sympathy and judged mitigation of 
punishment were encoded in activity in precuneus. This overlapping 
activity suggests that the precuneus may be a region that accepts emo-
tional judgment input and maps it into concrete punishment actions.
ACC is a region now thought to be activated by negative 
affect25,26, positive reward27 and cognitive control26,28. In our 
context, mapping emotional sympathy into numerical sentencing 
requires high-level executive function by weighing negative affec-
tive reaction to murder, positive sympathy for the murder’s mitigat-
ing circumstances and exerting cognitive control to choose numeri-
cal punishments that weigh these emotions consistently.
Smaller regions in caudate also showed differential activation 
in response to punishment reduction (Supplementary Table S2). 
Caudate activity is consistent with the hypothesis that sentence 
reduction is encoded as a special kind of prosocial ‘charity’ (as 
mitigation is like giving to charity29), as other prosocial choices 
activate the caudate too30.
One fMRI study elicited punishment judgments in artificial 
scenarios varying offender culpability6 and reports right DLPFC 
activity associated with responsibility judgments. We speculate that 
the absence of right DLPFC activation in our study is because there 
is no doubt about the defendants’ guilt, so the most morally burden-
some question of guilt versus innocence is resolved (right DLPFC 
is discharged from jury duty, so to speak). Activity then shifts to 
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Figure 1 | Task design and behavioural performance. (a) study paradigm. (b) mean punishment ratings for sympathy and no-sympathy trials (n = 22, 
paired t-test, t21 =  − 18.94, P < 0.001). (c) mean sympathy ratings for sympathy and no-sympathy trials (n = 22, paired t-test, t21 = 11.82, P < 0.001).  
(d) Correlation between sympathy and punishment ratings for sympathy stories (red circles) and no-sympathy stories (green circles). Error bars indicate s.d.
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areas generally associated with moral and cognitive conflicts instead 
(DMPFC, precuneus and ACC).
The individual difference analysis showed that activity in the right 
mid-insula was related to the individual differences on the inclina-
tion to mitigate (mapping sympathy to sentences). Middle/posterior 
insula has been suggested to encode economic inequity31, norm 
violation32, somatosensory representation33, monitoring internal 
states34 and heart rate during a compassionate state35. These types 
of interoceptive processing in middle insula suggest that it is sen-
sitive to emotions linked to sociality. Our study provides unusual 
evidence of this processing associated with a unique high-impact 
social judgment that affects others.
The identified brain activity provides new insight into the capacity 
of the average brain to translate sympathetic feelings into appropri-
ate legal action. A plausible neuro-legal standard is that the influence 
X = –2
Figure 2 | Brain regions activated during trial-by-trial sympathy 
and punishment reduction. Regions in which activity correlated with 
parametric regressors of increasing sympathy (green) and reduced 
punishment (red). Common areas were found in precuneus (yellow). The 
image is shown at P < 0.001 (uncorrected; n = 22, one-sample t-tests).
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Figure 3 | Individual differences in inclination towards mitigation. 
Activation in right middle insula in the contrast sympathy minus no-
sympathy trials (a, mnI 34/ − 8/12; n = 22, one-sample t-test, P = 0.023, 
small-volume-corrected) correlated with participant-wise coefficient of 
mitigation (b, n = 22, Pearson r =  − 0.62, P = 0.002).
Table 1 | Areas exhibiting a stronger response in sympathy scenarios.
Region Side MNI coordinates Z k SVC
Posterior cingulate cortex R 2  − 50 28 4.05 2946 0.001
Precuneus L  − 2  − 68 42 3.85
Precuneus R 0  − 18 28 3.73
middle frontal gyrus R 36 16 60 4.11 1501
superior frontal gyrus R 20 32 58 4.08
superior frontal gyrus L  − 18 24 64 4.06
Temporo-parietal junction (middle temporal gyrus) L  − 50  − 72 20 4.15 535 0.001
Temporo-parietal junction (angular gyrus) L  − 46  − 64 34 3.58
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. orbitalis) L  − 40 34  − 14 4.37 296
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. triangularis) L  − 50 36 18 3.62
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. triangularis) L  − 42 34 0 3.54
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (superior medial gyrus) L  − 4 44 22 3.50 217 0.008
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (superior medial gyrus) L  − 4 54 28 3.49
Superior frontal gyrus L  − 12 52 34 3.33
Caudate nucleus R 12 18 8 3.82 179
Hippocampus R 26  − 32  − 8 3.47 151
Parahippocampal gyrus R 28  − 24  − 22 3.43
Caudate nucleus L  − 8 18 2 3.53 101
Caudate nucleus L  − 12 14 10 3.37
middle temporal gyrus L  − 52 4  − 32 3.72 81
Lingual gyrus R 16  − 44  − 8 3.50 59
Parahippocampal gyrus R 26 10  − 30 3.68 48
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (superior medial gyrus) R 10 44 50 3.37 23 0.011
Superior frontal gyrus R 16 16 46 44
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. orbitalis) L  − 26 26  − 26 3.56 22
Temporal pole L  − 36 22  − 32 3.19
medial temporal pole R 44 16  − 38 3.37 13
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. orbitalis) R 38 28  − 12 3.22 13
Temporal pole L  − 34 6  − 20 3.17 12
Abbreviation: sVC, small volume correction.
A priori regions of interest are in bold (P < 0.001, k > 10). 
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of sympathetic reaction on difficult sentencing should recruit brain 
areas that process sympathy judgments in general, as well as areas 
that encode difficult decision conflict. Activity in these ‘sympathy’ 
regions is evident in our study when judging sympathy alone, and in 
choosing sentence mitigation. However, not every brain maps sym-
pathy to prison sentences in the same numerical way (as reflected 
in differential mid-insula activity). Differences in these brain circuits 
between individuals, suggest that differential juror responses might 
need to be considered unequally. There is also mixed evidence about 
the normative basis of legal judgment, including a recent finding that 
judges’ decisions are affected by timing of meals36.
The current finding would also contribute to the attribution lit-
erature on situational correction, as there has not been any fMRI 
work on this. People often attribute behaviour to the corresponding 
personal disposition, which is, yet, corrected based on situational 
inducements too37. This is an apt psychological function behind 
mitigating circumstances that is to make someone less culpable, and 
the revealed brain activity might be associated with this type of situ-
ational correction.
Finally, we note that many legal principles treat emotional 
responses as likely to be prejudicial and prone to inflammatory 
manipulation (that is, an ideal juror would suppress them and legal 
rules limit their influence). Weighing mitigating circumstances 
during sentencing (after a verdict) represents an unusual case in 
which emotional sympathy judgment is actually required. Japanese 
criminal law, for example, requires that the decision among these 
sentences be based on mitigating circumstances38.
Ironically, the fact that sympathy is clearly evident in brain activ-
ity, and influences sentence mitigation (as it should), raises interest 
in the opposite question: can people also suspend emotions when 
the law instructs them to? More generally, a deeper understanding 
of the brain could help figure out how highly evolved brain struc-
tures, which were sculpted to maintain order in small-scale ances-
tral societies, can be put to work under modern legal rules in much 
more challenging cases to create modern justice.
Methods
Participants. A total of 26 right-handed healthy subjects (12 males; mean 
age = 21.5 ± 1.8 (s.d.) years) participated in the study. All subjects had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, no history of neurological or psychiatric disorder and 
were not taking medications that interfere with the performance of fMRI. The 
study was approved by the Ethics and Radiation Safety Committee of the National 
Institute of Radiological Sciences (Chiba, Japan). Data from four participants were 
discarded owing to excessive movement (three subjects) and sleep (one subject). 
The data from 22 subjects (11 males; mean age = 21.5 ± 1.9 (s.d.) years) were 
included and analysed.
Stimuli and the task. A total of 32 faces of defendants and criminal acts were pre-
pared in the study. Faces were drawn from a set of Asian face stimuli developed by 
CAS-PEAL face database39. Pilot participants (n = 30) rated attractiveness for each 
faces using an 11-point scale of  − 5 (not attractive at all) to  + 5 (very attractive). 
The average attractiveness for 32 faces was 0.15 ± 0.70.
All criminal acts were the pure murder cases, which were modified from real 
stories taken from a precedent search engine provided by Supreme Court of Japan 
(www.courts.go.jp) and from news articles on the web. We prepared 32 scenarios 
and consulted a judicial expert for advice on how externally valid the scenarios 
were. Each scenario composed of the fact (when, where and to whom) and the 
circumstance (why the defendant committed the murder). Half of the scenarios 
would induce sympathy for the defendants who suffer from domestic violence, 
death to disease or poverty (sympathy scenarios), and the other half that would not 
(no-sympathy scenarios). Responsibility, intentionality and severity of crime were 
matched between scenarios (see Supplementary Methods for all scenarios used in 
the study).
Subjects were instructed to judge crimes as if they were jurors (lay judges). 
Before entering the scanner, subjects read each criminal case and were asked to 
indicate if they have known them through media. The aim of this session was to 
ensure and ease comprehension in the scanner that constrain duration of present-
ing each scenario. During the fMRI task, subjects read each scenario and rated how 
much they would like to reduce or increment the sentence (all 20 years) given for 
the defendant using a VAS (with scores ranging from 0 = reduce as much as pos-
sible to 100 = increment as much as possible, and 50 = given sentence of 20 years; 
Fig. 1a). We chose a sentence of 20 years as a reference point, based on a sentencing 
guideline in Japan that gives 20 years in prison to a person who commits  
murder. Defendants’ faces were presented together with the scenarios in order  
to make the experimental setting more realistic and to help participants to  
dedicate to the study. They completed two sessions, and each session contained  
8 sympathy and 8 no-sympathy scenarios, 16 trials in total. The presentation of 
each scenario within a session was pseudorandomized. The order of sessions  
and the combination of faces and circumstance types were counterbalanced 
between subjects.
After the scan, subjects were shown the same scenarios again to rate how 
much they felt sympathy for the defendants using a VAS (with scores ranging 
from 0 = having no sympathy to 100 = having sympathy very much). They were 
also asked to fill out Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), a self-report measure of 
dispositional empathy.
fMRI data acquisition. The functional imaging was conducted using a GE 3.0 
Tesla Excite system to acquire gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar images with 
blood oxygenation level-dependent contrast. Each volume comprised 35 transaxial 
contiguous slices with a slice thickness of 3.8 mm to cover almost the whole brain 
(flip angle, 75; echo time, 25 ms; repetition time, 2000 ms; matrix, 64*64; and field 
of view, 24×24 cm2).
fMRI data preprocessing. Image analysis was performed using SPM8 (Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK), except 
for the overlay image shown in Fig. 2  that was created using the MRIcron software 
(http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/rorden/mricron/). All volumes were realigned to the 
first volume of each session to correct for subject motion and were spatially normal-
ised to the standard space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)  
template. After normalisation, images were spatially smoothed using a Gaussian 
kernel with a full-width-at-half-maximum of 8 mm. Intensity normalisation and  
high-pass temporal filtering (using a filter width of 128 s) were also applied to the data.
Generalized linear model. For the primary whole-brain analyses, two modelling 
approaches were used. In the first approach, trials from each of the sympathy and 
no-sympathy circumstances were modelled as separate conditions. This allowed 
separate estimation of the evoked response for each of the conditions at each voxel.  
The model also included regressors for face, criminal evidence, punishment, and 
fixation, as well as six head-motion parameters as regressors of no interest. We  
first calculated a first-level single-subject contrast for reading sympathy minus  
no-sympathy circumstances. Then, we calculated a second-level group contrasts 
using a one-sample t-test. In the second approach, all trials from reading circum-
stances modelled using a single condition (that is, overall task-related activation), 
and two additional orthogonal parametric regressors were included representing  
(a) the amount of reducing punishment and (b) the level of sympathy rating. We 
first calculated first-level single-subject contrasts for reading circumstances modu-
lated by reducing punishment and for reading circumstances modulated by sympa-
thy rating. Then, we calculated second-level group contrasts using one-sample  
t tests on the single-subject contrasts to identify brain regions whose activation 
correlated with the amount of reducing punishment and the sympathy rating. 
A statistical threshold of P < 0.05 corrected for multiple spatial comparisons 
across the whole brain at cluster level was used, except for a priori hypothesized 
regions that were voxel thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected (only clusters involv-
ing k > 10 or more contiguous voxels were reported40). Small volume correction 
(a 10-mm radius sphere) was used on a priori regions of interest: DMPFC/ACC, 
precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex, TPJ and the insula. 
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